Anarchy Or Order - the Nth Country Problem and the International Rule of Law by Firmage, Edwin Brown
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 2 Spring 1964 Article 2 
Spring 1964 
Anarchy Or Order - the Nth Country Problem and the International 
Rule of Law 
Edwin Brown Firmage 
false 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edwin Brown Firmage, Anarchy Or Order - the Nth Country Problem and the International Rule of Law, 29 
MO. L. REV. (1964) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol29/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
ANARCHY OR ORDER? THE Nth COUNTRY




Events proceeding from the explosion of the first -atomic bomb at
Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, may revolutionize traditional
concepts of international law. The need to create internationally recognized
rules of law which will control atomic energy exists to a degree that dwarfs
the demands that have been placed upon law in the past. Thomas E. Mur-
ray, a Commissioner on the Atomic Energy Commission, has recognized
the problem:
In no field does the need for international order exist more im-
peratively than in the field of nuclear energy. In the concept of
order I include a whole set of notions-regulation, control, super-
vision, commonly accepted standards of health and safety, and
above all the institution of free and orderly procedures of coopera-
tion among nations. You have heard statements about the danger
of our gradually drifting into a state of atomic anarchy. This is a
good phrase in which to describe the state in which we already
find ourselves. Surely this is true in the field of nuclear weapons.
Each of the nations engaged in their development and production
is acting as a law unto itself.
There are no common norms or standards binding all; there
are no common agreements accepted by all. The result is inter-
national lawlessness or anarchy which shows itself chiefly in the
ungoverned-and for the moment seemingly ungovernable-race
for nuclear armaments.
This international situation is not simply the road to anarchy.
It is itself anarchy. Unless and until this anarchy is resolved into
some decent measure of order, neither America nor the world at
large could enjoy even the basic security that consists in the assur-
ance of continued national existence.'
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. Statement made in testimony given May 10, 1957. Hearings Before the
Cornmittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and Senate Members of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Executive I, The Statute of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 174 (1957).
(138)
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In the past we have been able to rely upon the gradual development
of customary rules of international law to govern the behavior of nations.
In the last hundred years, technological revolutions occurred at about the
intervals of each major war. Today, technological revolution are now oc-
curring every five years.2 Atomic energy would seem to fall into that cat-
egory of technology which is advancing at such a rate as to defy the
attempts of customary international law, taken alone, to control it.
One problem caused by the advent of atomic energy is especially un-
suited to control through the development of customary international law.
That is the problem of the proliferation of an independent nuclear military
capacity, termed in the jargon of arms control, the "Nth country problem."
If the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be avoided, it must be done
within the next few years.3
One scholar feels that a rule of customary international law has al-
ready evolved to the effect that a state which permits fissionable materials
to go to another state without safeguards to insure its peaceful use violates
international law.4 This would be difficult to maintain when the Soviet
Union does not comply with the supposed law in its fairly broad program
of bilateral agreements for the transfer of fissionable materials, and when
EURATOM has a system of self-inspection which has been rejected by the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
To talk in terms of an international law governing the distribution of
nuclear weapons at the present time is to propose that wishing might make
it so. When the matter to be controlled by law is the commercial inter-
course among nations, it may be meaningful to refer to a rule of conduct
to which most commercial nations adhere as a rule of law, even though
other nations do not follow such a rule. However, when the subject-matter
to be controlled is the proliferation of nuclear military capacity, the lack
of acquiescence of one of the two major suppliers of nuclear fuel, installa-
tions, and technology renders any so-called "law" absolutely futile. To wait
one hundred years until a degree of unanimity gradually occurs would be
impossible.
The order which must be achieved in the area of atomic energy cannot
be completely established by unilateral or bilateral acts of nations, gradually
2. See KAHN, ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR 125 (1961).
3. "A serious effort to think through the implications of what has been
called the 'Nth country problem' is all the more essential because the early 1960's
represent perhaps the last moment when it can still be dealt with.' KIsSINGER, THE
NECESSITY FOR CHoIcE 212 (1961).
4. Stein, The New International Atomic Energy Agency, PROCEEDINGS OF
AMERICAN SocIry OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 158, 162-63 (1957).
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leading to the creation of customary international law. Only through re-
gional and international organizations, or by treaty, can norms be quickly
and finally established to control atomic energy.
Various regional and international organizations are working, some-
times at cross-purposes, to establish controls over the indiscriminate pro-
liferation of nuclear military capacity.5 The attempts of two interna-
tional organizations,6 the United Nations and the International Atomic
Energy Agency, to combat the Nth country problem by establishing law
in the increasingly anarchical state of international atomic energy will be
examined. The major focus is upon the International Atomc Energy since
its work in this area is current.
If the force of law is to be brought to bear upon the proliferation of
nuclear military capacity, it is submitted that this will occur through the
development of international organizations of control. Much attention has
been given to proposed international organizations which could enforce
existing law. Comparatively little attention has been given to international
organizations which could create the law to be enforced. The focus of what
follows is upon the latter. Problems of achieving that degree of unanimity
among nations which is necessary to be able to talk meaningfully about
rules of international law governing the proliferation of nuclear military
capacity will here be examined.
THE NTH CouNr'TY PROBLEM
Some writers consider the Nth country problem to be the most crucial
problem of our time7 While other writers question the seriousness or at
least the immediacy of this threat,$ all agree that indiscriminate prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons greatly increases the precariousness of the con-
tinued existence of humanity.
This can be seen by an examination of the nature of the possible origin
of a nuclear war. In his famous book, On Thermonuclear War, Herman
5. See Cavers, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy, 12 VAND. L. REv. 17 (1958), for an analysis of the many regional organiza-
tions which exercise some degree of control over atomic energy.
6. The IAEA has a loose connection with the UN family of organizations,
but this relationship is so amorphous that the organizations are here considered
as being separate entities.
7. Aiken, Can We Limit the Nuclear Club? 17 BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
263 (No. 7, 1961); Blackett, Thoughts on British Defense Policy, The New States-
man (Dec. 5, 1959); Simons, World Wide Capabilities for Production and Control
of Nuclear Weapons, Daedalus 385 (Summer, 1959).
8. E.g., Teller, The Feasibility of Arms Control and the Principle of Open-
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Kahn listed some possible causes of World War III in order of their likeli-
hoodY The first three causes involved some form of accident. If many na-
tions were working to build an independent nuclear capacity, the likelihood
of war by accident would increase tremendously. Projecting this hypothet-
ical situation to the stage of the development of a weapons system built
on nuclear capacity, one would see each nation's nuclear force going through
that extremely dangerous stage of "soft" nuclear weapons in which the
chance of accidents of many forms is great. Soft nuclear weapons by defini-
tion could not withstand an initial first strike by an enemy. Consequently,
they must be constantly on a hair-trigger alert status. This would make it
impossible to apply safety features -designed to avoid accidental or un-
authorized firings.
A new form of catalytic war causation is projected onto the stage by
the Nth country problem.10 This presents the situation of a desperate third
nation deliberately starting a nuclear war between the major powers on
the rationale that its relative status among the nations of the world would
be bettered by an all-out nuclear war. This possibility cannot be lightly dis-
missed in view of a belief reportedly held by the Chinese Communists that
after such a war there would be 10 million Americans, 20 million Russians,
and 350 million Chinese left alive.1 This view may have been tenable if
1950 fission bombs were used as the basis of the statistics. However, with
the thermonuclear weapons of the 1960's, China would be totally oblit-
erated if such were the desire of a major thermonuclear power. This fact
would seem to lessen the chances of a thermonuclear war being initiated
by a desperate or ambitious third nation. However, the Sino-Soviet split
which has recently come to a head would seem to refute the idea that the
Chinese Communists realize the portent of the weapons developments of
the last 10 years. If this is so, they could well be motivated to act as a
catalyst upon the great powers in such a way as to initiate an unwanted
war which would be nonetheless catastrophic because it was initiated on
the basis of incorrect knowledge.
Of course, with the existence of independent nuclear military capacity,
the chances of a nuclear war of aggression increase by a factor roughly
determined by the number of nuclear nations. The world has already seen
for the first time in history what can happen when "street gangs" seize
9. See discussion beginning at 190 and Table 136 at 227.
10. For an analysis of a catalytic war, see Kahn, The Arms Race and Some
of Its Hazards, in Brennan (ed.), op. cit. supra note 8, at 101.
11. Statement reputedly made by Chou En-lai to a Yugoslav diplomat and
reported in KiSSINGER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 253.
1964]
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"control of the resources of a great modem State."'12 The prospect of a
neurotic head of state deciding to bring the world down around him if his
ambitions are frustrated is not without precedent in history.13 The posses-
sion of nuclear power brings this within the realm of possibility. The Nth
country problem could at some time in the future bring this to a stage of
ultimate probability.
The Baruch Plan-The United Nations and
the Nth Country Problem
The first effort to control atomic energy was the Baruch plan.
In November of 1945, a Joint Declaration by the Heads of Govern-
ment of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada called for the
creation of a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to study ways
of controlling atomic power.14 Russia agreed to this proposal, and, follow-
ing the Moscow Communiqu6 of December, 1945,15 the United States, the
United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and Canada joined in sponsoring a resolution
in the United Nations which led to the creation of the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission.
In anticipation of the creation of the Commission, the United States
government appointed a committee to submit proposals to the Commis-
sion when it was organized. Among others, the committee included Dean
Acheson, John J. McCloy, Dr. Vannevar Bush, David E. Lilienthal, and
Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. The resulting recommendations, termed the
Acheson-Lilienthal Report,16 included all of the basic proposals of what
became known as the Baruch Plan.1 7
Since atomic capacity was had by only one country, it was thought pos-
sible at this time to return the atomic genie to its bottle. No problems of
hidden stockpile of atomic weapons existed. The Baruch Plan called for
international ownership of all aspects of atomic energy. It provided for the
12. BULLOCK, HITLER: A STUDY iN T R, 229 (Bantam ed., 1961).
13. Id. at 681, where the tragic account of the end of the Third Reich is re-
lated.
14. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1 DocuMENTs ON DISARMAMENT: 1945-1956 at
1-3 (Pub. No. 7008 1960).
15. Id. at 3-5, Moscow Communique by the Foreign Ministers of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, December 27, 1945.
16. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE ACHESoN-LILIENTHAL REPORT (Pub. No.
2498 1946).
17. See The Baruch Plan: Statement by the United States Representative
[Baruch] to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946, DE-
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creation of an International Atomic Development Agency (IADA), which
would further the peaceful uses of atomic energy and at the same time
possess rigorous inspection privileges over all aspects of the production of
fissionable material. This international agency of the United Nations would
receive all the information and equipment possessed by the United States.
The United States would destroy all of its atomic bombs.
Taken at face value, the United States was offering to give up volun-
tarily the greatest strategic advantage ever possessed by one powerful
nation over another. However, the Russians saw this plan as an attempt
to insure that the U.S.S.R. would never have the nuclear capability pos-
sessed by the West. Since Western nations would control the proposed
International Atomic Development Agency, the Russians professed to see
little difference between this and outright United States control.
The big difference between the United States and the U.S.S.R., at
least as seen from the debates, centered on whether the United States
relinquished its nuclear weapons as the first or the last step in the process.
We insisted on complete control before disarmament, while the U.S.S.R.
insisted on complete nuclear disarmament before control. Whether the
U.S.S.R. would have agreed to the amazing degree of control envisaged by
the Baruch Plan even if we agreed to their chronology is extremely doubt-
ful. The Baruch Plan would have called for a revolution in Russian society.
Unfortunately, however, we permitted the U.S.S.R. to reject the Baruch
Plan on the tenable basis of no inspection before disarmament instead of
forcing them to, deal with the degree to which they would permit their
society to be breached.
Fruitless negotiations continued until 1949 when one of the two events
destined to change the whole nature of disarmament proposals occurred.
In 1949 the Soviet Union set off its first atomic explosion. With each passing
year the Baruch Plan became increasingly impossible to accomplish. As
atomic stockpiles grew in each country, the aspects of international owner-
ship and control became proportionately more difficult. Finally, with the
first Soviet thermonuclear explosion in 1954, international ownership was
dropped from the arms control proposals of the United States.
The Baruch Plan, with its massive system of inspection and verifica-
tion, could allow a margin of error in detecting clandestine stockpiles of
fissionable material. But with the introduction of hydrogen weapons, the
possession of a very small amount of weapons-grade plutonium, kept in
clandestine stockpiles, would suffice to give complete world domination to
its owner if all other thermonuclear materials were unavailable to the other
1964]
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nations. The testing in 1954 at Bikini convinced scientists that the gulf
between the high explosives of World War II and nuclear weapons was not
nearly so great as the revolutionary difference between nuclear and thermo-
nuclear explosives.' 8 Following the first explosion of a hydrogen bomb,
Prime Minister Churchill described the results to the House of Commons:
We must realize that the gulf between the conventional high
explosive bomb in use at the end of the war with Germany on the
one hand, and the atomic bomb as used against Japan on the other,
is smaller than the gulf developing between that bomb and the
hydrogen bomb .... With all its horrors the atomic bomb did not
seem unmanageable as an instrument of war, and the fact that
the Americans have such an immense preponderance over Russia
has given us passage through eight anxious and troublous years.
But the hydrogen bomb carries us into dimensions which have
never confronted practical human thought .... 1
With the immense problems presented by the growth of stockpiles
to almost unmanageable proportions and the consequent effect upon in-
spection and control proposals of any disarmament plan, compounded by
the threatened proliferation of nuclear weapons to what was then called
the "4th country," new approaches were put forth20 dealing with inspection
to avoid surprise attack, the control of testing, the control of production
of fissile material, and the avoidance of proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Atoms for Peace: The International Atomic Energy Agency
One such new approach resulted in the creation of the International
Atomic Energy Agency.2' Three major functions were to be performed by
this agency. First, source materials for nuclear weapons were to be con-
18. See LAPP, THE VOYAGE OF THE LUCKY DRAGON (1958).
19. Delivered April 5, 1954, as quoted by BECHHOEFER, PosTwAR NEGOTIA-
TIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL 244 (1961).
20. For the best account of the Baruch Plan and circumstances surrounding
its origin, see DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC
ENERGY: GROWTH OF A POLICY (Pub. No. 2702 1946). See DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY: POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS
(Pub. No. 3161 1948), for an account of the negotiation surrounding the Baruch
Plan. For analyses of the Baruch Plan, see BARUCH, THE PUBLIC YEARS (1960);
COIT, MR. BARUCH (1957); NOEL-BAKER, THE ARMS RACE: A PROGRAMME FOR
WORLD DISARMAMENT (1958); Hohenemser, The Nth Country Problem Today,
DISARMAMENT: ITS POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 238-78 (Melman ed. 1958); BECH-
HOEFER, op. cit. supra note 19, at 27-159.
21. For President Eisenhower's famous "Atoms for Peace" speech, which led
to the creation of the IAEA, see U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 8th Sess., Plenary 443
(A/N 462) (1953).
An authoritative account of the history of the negotiations on the Statute of
the International Atomic Energy Agency has been given by Mr. Bernhard G.
[Vol. 29
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trolled to a limited degree. Second, diminution of existing atomic stockpiles
was to be accomplished through transfers of fissile material to the Agency.
Third, peaceful applications of atomic energy were to be developed, espe-
cially the utilization of atomic energy for power purposes.
The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency has been in-
terpreted elsewhere. 22 Only as much of the Statute as is relevant to the
development of world law will here be set forth.
Representative of all nations in the IAEA constitute the first of its
three organs, the General Conference.2 3 The Board of Governors24 is the
executive organ of the Agency, and the Director General and his staff25
constitute the administrative branch.
The basic objectives of the IAEA are defined in Article II of the Stat-
ute:
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribu-
tion of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout
the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance pro-
vided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is
not used in such a way as to further any military purposes.
To effectuate these goals the Agency is empowered to carry out several
functions. It fosters the exchange of experts and of scientific information, 26
Bechhoefer. Negotiating the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
13 INTER. ORG. 38 (1959). Mr. Bechhoefer participated in the negotiations leading
to the formation of IAEA as Special Assistant to the United States Representative,
Morehead Patterson. Mr. Bechhoefer was later acting Chief of the IAEA Branch
of the Division of International Affairs of the Atomic Energy Commission.
For other accounts of the negotiations, see Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, REPORT OF THE COMmITlEE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS ON EXECUTIVE
I, 85th CONG., 1st SEss., June 14, 1957; Cavers, International Cooperation in the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 12 VAND. L. REv. 17 (1958); Freeman, The De-
velopment of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy, 54
A.J.I.L. 383 (1960); Rubinstein, The United States, The Soviet Union, and Atoms-
For-Peace: Background to the Establishment of the United Nations International
Atomic Energy Agency, 30 WORLD AFFAIRS Q. 46 (1959).
22. Bechhoefer & Stein, Atoms for Peace: The New International Atomic
Energy Agency, 55 Mic. L. REv. 747 (1957). See also Freeman, supra note 21;
Cavers, supra note 21; Stoessinger, The International Atomic Energy Agency: The
First Phase, 13 INTER. ORG. 394 (1959); Hohenemser, The Nth Country Problem
Today, DISARMAMENT: ITS POLITICs AND ECONOMIcs 238 (Melman ed. 1962);
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON ExECUTIVE I, 85th CONG., 1st SESS. (June 14, 1957).
The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency can be found in 35
DEP'T STATE BULL. 820 (1956); 51 AJ.I.L. 466 (1957); Treaties and Other Inter-
national Acts Series (U.S.), No. 3873; U.N. Doe. IAEA/CS/13; N.Y. Times, Oct.
24, 1956; hereinafter referred to as Statute.
23. Statute, Art. V.
24. Statute, Art. VI.
25. Statute, Art. VII.
26. Statute, Art. III.
19641
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develops safety regulations for workers on nuclear projects,2' and generally
provides technical assistance for non-atomic countries regarding the peace-
ful utilization of atomic energy. This includes aid in project planning,28
instruction in the use of radioactive isotopes,29 providing or securing nuclear
materials and equipment,0 and aiding in obtaining financing.31 The Agency
is authorized to accumulate a pool of fissionable materials32 to be distrib-
uted to nations which qualify under the standards of the Statute. Article
VIII deals with the exchange of information on nuclear technology which
the Agency is to foster. Along with those sections previously mentioned
which also further the scientific and technological nuclear capacity of pres-
ently non-nuclear countries, this Article is one of the two most important
sections in the Statute for the purpose of Nth country considerations.
The most controversial part of the Statute and the second vital section
for a consideration of proliferation is Article XII, which provides for the
establishment of a system of safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear
material supplied by the Agency to military purposes. This Article provides
for the fulfillment of the negative aspect of the basic objective of the Agency
as defined in Article II: The Agency shall "ensure ... that assistance pro-
vided by it ... is not used in such a way as to further any military pur-
poses." Article XII authorizes the Agency to fulfill this injunction by estab-
lishing and administering a system of safeguards to prevent diversion. The
Article further provides that this system of safeguards shall mandatorily
be placed on specified types of fissile material and nuclear facilities supplied
to a beneficiary state by the Agency. Article III permits the Agency to
apply the safeguards system of the Agency, upon request of the state or
states concerned, to the facilities of any state or any facilities of sev-
eral states operating under a bilateral or multilateral arrangement (e.g.,
EURATOM).
These safeguards have now been established by the Agency. In 1959
a set of rules and procedures to effectuate the general principles laid down
by the Statute was prepared by the Agency's Secretariat and discussed by
the Board of Governors. After debate among the Board of Governors, a
revised draft was prepared and presented to the Board in 1960. The Board
then set up a Special Working Group of Experts to prepare a working paper.
From this a safeguards system was developed.
27. Statute, Art. III.
28. Statute, Art. IX.
29. Statute, Art. IX.
30. Statute, Arts. IX and X.
31. Statute, Art. XI.
32. Statute, Art. IX.
[Vol. 29
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The principles and procedures of the safeguards system relate only to
reactors with a given megawatt thermal output, to nuclear material used
and produced in these reactors, and to small research and development
facilities. Nuclear material supplied by the Agency, of a given kind and
above a given quantity, is subject to the safeguards provisions. Principal
nuclear facilities (i.e., reactors, fuel processing plants, and isotope separa-
tion plants) provided by the Agency are also subject to safeguards and in-
spection requirements. However, one major break with the Baruch Plan is
that no safeguards are attached to mines, to mining equipment, or to ore
processing plants.33
Under the safeguards plan established by the Agency under authority
of Articles III and XII, a given number of inspections may be made by
the Agency at its own timing. It may inspect the safeguarded facility or
material, audit reports and records, and verify the amounts of material.
The number and nature of the inspections depend on the nature of the
reactor and the amount of the nuclear material used or produced in it.34
Under the Statute itself, the Agency has the following control over
Agency projects: (1) access to all records of the project; (2) limited con-
trol over by-products; (3) approval over means of irradiating materials;
(4) rights of inspection by IAEA inspectors in the recipient state; (5) the
right to suspend or terminate assistance on grounds of non-compliance with
Agency requirements; (6) the duty to report non-compliance to the Secu-
rity Council and the General Assembly. 5
A Critique of the International Atomic Energy Agency
Most writers have concluded that the International Atomic Energy
Agency has failed to accomplish any of its major functions. 8 Whether the
Agency is viewed primarily as an institution to prevent diversion,T or as
an aid to the economic development of underdeveloped countries, 8 or as
a "first step" toward creating the sort of political climate which could lead
33. See INFCIRC/26, International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna), 1961
(text of approved safeguards system of IAEA).
34. Ibid.
35. Statute, Arts. III and XII.
36. See, e.g., OsGooD, NATO, THE ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 219 (1962);
Hohenemser, The Nth. Country Problem Today, DiSAxMAMENT: ITS PoLrrscs Am
ECONOMICS 264 (Melman ed. 1962); A Forgotten Outpost, 196 THE EcoNoMIST
1223 (Sept. 24, 1960).
37. E.g., Hohenemser, supra note 20, at 264-66.
38. Rubinstein, supra note 21.
1964]
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1964], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol29/iss2/2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
to substantively more important disarmament measures,3 9 this conclusion
appears to be almost unanimous.
Yet recent developments in the use of large-scale nuclear reactors to
produce commercial electric power make the effective working of the IAEA
all the more necessary. When the concept of an international agency to
control the spread of nuclear capacity was first proposed, it was thought
that the development of nuclear power plants would immediately prove
commercially feasible, resulting in a rapid diffusion of nuclear capacity.
That proliferation has not occurred to a greater extent than it has is at
least partially the result of the inability, up to this time, to make nuclear
power commercially competitive. Now, however, technological progress has
occurred at an unexpectedly high speed toward making electric power from
nuclear reactors competitive with power from conventional steam and
hydroelectric plants.4o
The result of this technological breakthrough will inevitably be an
increase in demands by the underdeveloped countries upon nuclear powers
for assistance in developing their nuclear capacity. Without effective con-
trols to prevent both the diversion of nuclear materials to military purposes
and the use of knowledge gained in programs designed to promote the appli-
cation of nuclear knowledge to peaceful purposes in the development of
nuclear military capacity, nuclear chaos could result.
Conceivably, the United States and the U.S.S.R. could reach a bilateral
agreement on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
the capacity to independently produce such weapons. The time has passed,
however, when such an agreement could halt the spread of nuclear capacity.
Now, other nations and several international organizations possess both
nuclear capacity and materials. Clearly, the need of an international or-
ganization of control is necessary. Yet many problems must be resolved
before the International Atomic Energy Agency can adequately function in
this capacity.
The International Atomic Energy Agency
as a Distributor of Power Reactors
and Fissionable Material
A reading of the hearings on the Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency shows conclusively that the major motivations of the State
Department, as well as Congress, in pushing for the creation of the IAEA,
39. E.g., BEcHHOEFER, op. dt. supra note 19, at 256-58.
40. See Jolknron Tells of Atom Power Breakthrough, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
June 11, 1964, p. 1.
[Vol. 29
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were to internationalize the safeguards provisions of the United States bi-
lateral program to prevent diversion, and control in a limited degree the
source material for atomic weapons, thus helping to prevent indiscriminate
proliferation. Economic motivation hardly appears in the hearings.41 How-
ever, the failure of the International Atomic Energy Agency to fill the
role as the prime supplier of nuclear installations and material, while not
constituting a major setback in the accomplishment of the goals set out
for it by its American founders, would appear to be the primary reason for
it being written off as a failure by the bulk of the commentators.
Many reasons exist why the Agency is ill-fitted to act as the major sup-
plier of nuclear materials and power reactors. First, as Madhu Joshi has ob-
served, a nuclear nation can often obtain propaganda value and trade con-
cessions by dealing bilaterally.42 Second, if the beneficiary nation so desires,
it can avoid safeguards provisions by dealing with the U.S.S.R. The posi-
tion of the Soviets on bilateral agreements for nuclear material and re-
actors has been stated as assuring that "the principle of respect for the
sovereign rights of states [be] strictly observed.143 Interpreted, this means
that no safeguards are attached to reactors or fissionable material to pre-
vent diversion to military purposes. Third, a nuclear power, through gov-
ernmental sources or private industry, can often arrange for capital, loans,
insurance, and other advantages that the IAEA is not prepared to do for
the beneficiary nation. Fourth, the United States has made a policy of
absorbing the cost of the safeguards provisions attached to its bilateral
agreements while the Agency has required that the beneficiary state bear
this cost. This, along with other factors before mentioned, has resulted in
a slightly cheaper cost for nuclear materials if done under bilateral arrange-
ments than if done under IAEA auspices. 44 Fifth, various regional organ-
izations have nuclear aid programs with considerably less stringent safe-
guards provisions than the IAEA imposes. EURATOM, for example, does
not require that the beneficiary country return the fissionable by-product
materials to the supplier, as does the IAEA. The Nuclear Agency of the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) also has less
stringent standards of safeguards and inspection than the IAEA. It has
"periodic" and "announced" inspection which the Agency rejected." This
41. See supra note 1, at 1.
42. Joshi, Dead or Alive? International Atomic Energy Agency, 17 BULL. OF
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 95 (No. 3, 1961).
43. Yemelyanov, Atomic Energy for Peace: The U.S.S.R. and International
Cooperation, 38 FoREiGN AFFAIRS 465 (April, 1960).
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last disadvantage of the Agency as a supplier of nuclear materials obviously
carries over to its effectiveness as a creator of uniform safeguards and in-
spection arrangements.
Efforts should be made to effect agreements between the various
regional organizations and the IAEA upon uniform safeguards provisions
to bring the regional organizations into line with the Western nuclear nations
which are now voluntarily placing their bilateral agreements under the
safeguards and inspection provisions of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. "
As before stated, the function of the International Atomic Energy
Agency as a distributor of power reactors and fissionable material was not
one of the prime functions of the Agency as seen by its American founders.
While the Statute did provide for this, the function was seen by our top
governmental officers as being only supplementary to the prime function
of preventing uncontrolled proliferation and diversion. Some, such as Ster-
ling Cole, the first Director General of the IAEA, viewed the two functions
as inseparable. That is, without the function of prime distributor of reactors
and nuclear material, they thought that the establishment of a uniform
and inspected international system of safeguards could not be established.
It would now appear that the Agency will in fact be able to function as
the creator and administrator over an international safeguards system which
will operate primarily through the bilateral agreements made by the West-
ern powers. This has obvious limitations as an anti-proliferation and di-
version device, since the application of IAEA safeguards principles to bi-
lateral agreements is not mandatory and has not been done by the U.S.S.R.
This, however, represents no weakness that is not inherent within the IAEA
concept itself, whether the Agency serves as an atomic pool and supplier
of power reactors or serves as an inspection agency for bilateral agreements.
The International Atomic Energy Agency as a Device
Against Uncontrolled Proliferation and Diversion
The main function of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as seen
by its American founders, was to prevent uncontrolled proliferation and
diversion. It may ultimately be judged on the basis of how well it functions
in this respect. It is impossible at this date to give a conclusive answer
to this question, but several facts are now becoming apparent.
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First, a crucial "fact" relied on in planning for the IAEA was that the
world's supply of uranium would remain extremely limited. It was hoped to
control the sources of atomic weapons to avoid uncontrolled proliferation.
The "fact" thus relied upon is known now to be erroneous. This greatly
limits the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency as an
anti-proliferation device. It does not, however, completely eliminate the
Agency as a potential vehicle for the control of proliferation. It does mean
that the Agency will never constitute a major deterrent against proliferation
without vast changes in its present functions.
A prior question should be raised at this point. It may validly be asked
if the IAEA, far from being a deterrent to proliferation, does not in fact
constitute a gigantic engine of proliferation. What Bechhoefer and Stein
term the "positive function" and the "negative function" of the Agency may
amount to an impossible joining of opposites so far as the Nth country
problem is concerned.47 The "positive function" is the effort to "accelerate
and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and pros-
perity throughout the world." The "negative function" is to see that the
assistance provided by it "is not used in such a way as to further any mili-
tary purpose." 48 The Statute tries to prevent proliferation by providing
countries with help in achieving nuclear capacity for peaceful purposes,
while applying safeguards which prevent this capacity from being used for
military purposes. This assumes one of two things: (1) Once a country has
nuclear capacity for peaceful purposes, this will assuage the desire to de-
velop nuclear military capacity. This is a fallacious hope as long as that
country's competitors have the possibility of developing nuclear weapons or
in fact are then relying on nuclear weapons to maintain their relative posi-
tion in the world. (2) The safeguards provisions attached to the reactors
and nuclear material, while not preventing proliferation, at least prevent
that aspect of proliferation which is after all the only undesirable con-
comitant of proliferation, namely, diversion of nuclear material to military
uses. This would only be feasible if the Agency were the only source of
nuclear installations and materials, which it manifestly is not.
A potentially much greater threat to ultimate diversion exists within
the IAEA program itself. Even if the IAEA is able to police its nuclear
material and reactors, how can it conceivably place safeguards on the vast
amount of information it is distributing through the only popular and at
47. Bechhoefer & Stein, Atoms for Peace: The New International Atomic
Energy Agency, 55 MicH. L. REV. 747 (1957).
48. Statu~te, Art. II.
19(4]
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1964], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol29/iss2/2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
this time effective part of its program, the program of symposia, transfer
of experts, training of scientists in nuclear research and technology, and
collection of scientific literature? Safeguards can be placed upon reactors,
but how does the Agency plan to place safeguards on scientists' minds? It
is well known that the same knowledge which the IAEA disseminates
through literature, conferences, training projects, and symposia constitutes
the basic knowledge necessary to utilize atomic energy for military pur-
poses. What is to stop a country from training its scientists under IAEA
auspices and then disassociating itself from the Agency, obtaining nuclear
material from a regional organization or a nation which does not demand
the imposition of safeguards or inspection, and then developing some degree
of nuclear military capacity? There may in fact be quite a number of ob-
stacles to overcome, such as possession of a sufficient industrial base, but
none of these obstacles would represent institutional obstructions inherent
in the program of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
This problem was briefly raised by Senator Hickenlooper -during the de-
bate over the Statute in 1957.4 An exchange which occurred between
Senator Hickenlooper and Thomas E. Murray, a Commissioner on the
United States Atomic Energy Commission, is illuminating:
Hickenlooper: Nations who will come into this Agency to re-
ceive assistance from it will, in the main, be nations that do not
have the competence themselves to develop this science at this
moment.
Murray: I agree with that.
Hickenlooper: As these nations, if they have the latent or po-
tential ability to develop the science themselves with aid, do so,
a number of them probably will gain some'proficiency in the atomic
science.
Murray: No doubt about it.
Hickenlooper: As they gain proficiency in the peacetime uses
of the atomic sciences, don't they go a long step down the road
toward gaining knowledge and potential proficiency in the fabrica-
tion of weapons?
Murray: There is no question in my mind about that, yes.
Hickenlooper: If they do, then human nature being what it
is, .. . the time comes when a nation says "I will be responsible
for my own defense, and I will cease my association with this
49. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate
Members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Executive I, the Statute of
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Agency, with what I have learned, and will start making atomic
weapons for myself. .. ."
... [A]re we perchance speeding the day when many nations
can have the competence to make atomic weapons, because of the
educational and technical training which they will get through this
international agency? ... Are we possibly in a situation where a
father says, "My son is going to grow up and eventually drive an
automobile and have one of his own, so when he is 10 years old I
had better give him one now and start him out." .. . [A]re we
raising a potential Frankenstein monster here which can stalk the
earth at an earlier date than it otherwise would, and perhaps rise
up to plague us?50
Murray was forced to admit that the total effect of the International
Atomic Energy Agency could greatly increase the proliferation of nuclear
capacity. But Murray still gave testimony supporting the Agency as an
instrument to prevent diversion on the ground that only through an inter-
national institution could a safeguards and inspection system be inter-
nationalized. And only through an internationalization of the safeguards
and inspection system then employed by the United States in its bilateral
program could eventual diversion be prevented. Without the IAEA, the
best our nation could unilaterally accomplish would be to delay prolifera-
tion for some length of time. When proliferation finally occurred, which
to the experts seemed inevitable, there would be no institutional check on
diversion. What Hickenlooper in effect forced Murray to say was that in
spite of the increased proliferation caused by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, it should be supported by this country since it provided a
chance to internationalize the safeguards system developed by the United
States and thus provide one important element in an attempt to overcome
the anarchy which exists in international atomic energy today. Thus, the
IAEA was supported by Mr. Murray and others on the ultimate basis of
its becoming an international institution capable of creating international
law to govern an area of activity badly in need of such law.
It is submitted that this idea, mirroring the thinking expressed through-
out the hearings,"1 is valid only if the IAEA is looked upon as a first step
toward more serious disarmament measures. Taken alone, the hope that by
giving a nation nuclear information and material for peaceful purposes one
will thus deter it from developing nuclear military capacity is foolish. A
50. Id. at 184-85. Emphasis supplied.
51. See, e.g., the statement of Ambassador Wadsworth, Hearings at 164.
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true internationalization of safeguards and inspection provisions must in-
clude both beneficiary and donor nations.
In this respect, the complaints of the Indian government concerning
the safeguards provisions of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency seem valid. The major Indian objection was stated by Dr. H. J.
Bhabba, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Agency, in 1956:
The elaborate safeguards provisions of the present draft are
intended to ensure, if I may use an analogy, that not the slightest
leakage takes place from the wall of a tank, while ignoring the
fact that the tank has no bottom....
Besides the three States which already have atomic weapons,
there are a number of States which have the technical and material
resources to push forward their own atomic weapons programmes
without any aid from the Agency and to make atomic weapons, if
they so wish. The present safeguards will in no way stop their
progress. Further, there are many States, technically advanced,
which may undertake projects with Agency aid, fulfilling all the
present safeguards but in addition run their own parallel pro-
grammes independently of the Agency in which they could use the
experience and know-how obtained in Agency aided projects, with-
out being subject in any way to the system of safeguards."2
There is nothing in the Statute to prevent the knowledge gained by
scientists of a nation under the IAEA program of technical training to be
used for military purposes. The elaborate safeguards on materials and in-
stallations may prevent direct diversion, but what of the vast training
program of the IAEA? This may well be a critical mistake based on an
initial error in planning the International Atomic Energy Agency. As
previously stated, when the IAEA was originally established, it was thought
that there was an extreme scarcity of uranium. Now that it is known that
such is not the case, competent scientific manpower, technological capacity
and industrial advancement, rather than supplies of raw material for the
production of fissionable material, are the major impediments to the de-
velopment of nuclear capacity. Hence, any system of control over prolifera-
tion based on control over supplies of uranium is undercut. This leads to a
conclusion which will be developed later, that without a general disarma-
ment plan, including the inspected cut-off of production of fissionable ma-
terials and the dimunition of existing stockpiles, the International Atomic
Energy Agency may be a great vehicle of proliferation and eventual di-
52. U.N. Doc. IAEA/CS/OR, 7, at 50-51.
[Vol. 29
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version. Even though the Agency could not conceivably have been created
if the nuclear powers had been subject to the safeguards provisions in the
1950's, this must now be accomplished within a short time.
James Wadsworth 5 and Bernhard Bechhoefer54 have both presented a
"first step" rationale as one of the prime reasons for the creation of the
International Atomic Energy Agency. The basic argument is that by
taking limited "first steps" a political climate may be created which will
permit the accomplishment of later steps which are substantively more
meaningful. This argument has been recently bolstered by psychological
writings which link such steps to a graduated, unilateral but hopefully
reciprocal method of disarmament.5 5 The same argument was made in de-
fense of the recently accomplished partial nuclear test ban. The problem
with these "first steps" is that they seem to be taken without any clear
idea of what the second step is to be. Care must also be taken to see that
they do not constitute a first step in the wrong direction, or possibly a
first step in a direction in which no second step is feasible. The effect of such
"first steps" upon our alliance system must carefully be watched. If these
tension-reducing agreements are not quickly followed by substantively
meaningful disarmament measures, measures which at the same time do
not disrupt our alliance system, we will continue to do nothing more than
take ceremonial first steps leading nowhere.
Since the safeguards and inspection provisions of the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency do not apply to lending nations, or to
nations which develop their own nuclear capacity apart from the Agency,
or to bilateral agreements unless requested by the nations party to the
agreements, the world could eventually be filled with power reactors despite
the International Atomic Energy Agency. Until the major nuclear powers
are in some way made subject to the control provisions of the Statute, the
Agency soon will be meaningless as an instrument against uncontrolled
proliferation. To date, the International Atomic Energy Agency has failed
to deter any major Nth country from becoming a nuclear nation. Some
countries, such as India, have expressed no interest in developing a mili-
tary nuclear capacity, either before or after the creation of the Agency.
The Peoples Republic of China is not a member of the Agency and no in-
tention has ever been expressed by our government that she become a
member, even though many statements have been made to the effect that
53. Hearings, at 174.
54. BEcHHOEFER, Op. cit. supra note 19, at 241-49.
55. See e.g., OsGooD, AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR OR SURRENDER (1962).
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Communist China is our greatest long-term threat to world peace. In fact,
the negotiations concerning the Statute clearly show that the firm position
of our government was that China should not at any foreseeable time be-
come a member of the Agency. Our opposition to the Soviet demand for
universal membership was based on this fact. The Agency has not deterred
France from her goal of becoming a nuclear power, despite the effect this
must ultimately have upon Germany's desires for nuclear weapons.
Any other result then this could hardly be expected unless meaningful
steps are taken to place restrictions upon the military nuclear development
of the major powers. While the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United
Kingdom rely upon the possession of military nuclear capacity to maintain
their strategic position in relation to other nations, the major Nth countries
cannot really be expected to deprive themselves permanently from obtain-
ing military nuclear capacity. Some nations which have not expressed any
intention of developing military nuclear capacity have accepted the im-
position of safeguards upon their nuclear establishments. But Mr. Dulles
was hoping for much more when the International Atomic Energy Agency
was first proposed. He gambled that by helping spread nuclear technology
for peaceful purposes he would be able to dissuade key countries such as
France from the utilization of this knowledge for military purposes. He
lost. The Agency was mainly aimed at proliferation. The only discernible
result of the Agency in this area is that it has succeeded in spreading
nuclear technology. This is a rather wry result for a plan designed to
prevent diversion.
France has taken the position that Germany, Japan, and other countries
may someday take in regard to this prbolem. She has rejected the right of
the major powers to decry the dangers of proliferation and at the same
time rely upon military nuclear capacity to maintain their strategic posi-
tion in the world.
The logical second step to follow the creation of the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the accomplishment of a limited agreement to
ban some forms of nuclear testing would seem to be a controlled and in-
spected agreement to cease the production of nuclear weapons.-" This has
56. The recently concluded agreement by which the U.S.S.R. and the United
States will voluntarily and without inspection cease the production of nuclear weap-
ons, while a step in the right direction, does not fulfill this requirement. Before a
cut-off will be meaningful, given the present bloated stockpiles of nuclear weapons,
the gradual diminution of existing stockpiles must be underway. When this occurs,
an uninspected cut-off would be an invitation to catastrophe. The sort of inspected
cut-off of nuclear production which must soon occur if nuclear disarmament is to
be possible must provide for inspection, as does the proposal made by the United
[Vol. 29
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been called in disarmament parlance the "cut-off." The gigantic problems
involved in accomplishing such an act are not ignored by this writer, but
they are essentially beyond the scope of this article. The problems of in-
spection are manifold and are only exceeded by the problems which would
be involved in the third step, the gradual elimination of existing stockpiles.
Perhaps even more gigantic than the technical problems involved in in-
specting such agreements is the all-pervading problem of the degree to which
the societies of the two great powers will allow themselves to be breached
in the inspection process.
It may be that these problems are by this time insoluble. Stockpiles
may be such that no inspection plan could be comprehensive enough to
provide a sufficient degree of assurance against the possession of clandestine
stockpiles. It may be politically impossible in either country to reach
agreement on an inspected cut-off and stockpile reduction plan. If this is
so, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and perhaps any other instru-
ment against diversion, must fail.
CONCLUSION
Several functional problems exist in the International Atomic Energy
Agency: The Agency is hampered financially by the failure of the U.S.S.R.
to pay any portion of the expenses of the Agency other than the manda-
torily assessed amount; the underdeveloped countries are unwilling to con-
tribute to any projects other than those which immediately benefit them-
selves; the Board of Governors is too large to be an effective administrative
head of an agency, yet the Director General is given little discretionary
authority to compensate for this; political, geographical, and economic di-
visions badly undercut the Agency's effectiveness.
Yet these problems are minor as compared to those which have been
discussed before. Many have said that the International Atomic Energy
Agency is a failure. Implicit in some of these criticisms is the vaguely ar-
ticulated assumption that there is something inherently wrong in the
nature of the international institution which renders it incapable of per-
forming its intended functions. This leads to a search for possible minor
surgery to the organization of the Agency or some appendage to its func-
tions. The basic problem does not lie in this area. The fundamental diffi-
culty lies in the relationship between the major states. If co-operation is de-
States at the seventeen-nation disarmament conference at Geneva on June 25, 1964.
See U.S. Presents 3-Point Plan for Inspecting Nuclear Cutoff, St. Louis Post-Dis-
patch, June 26, 1964, p. 1.
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sired by the powerful nations, even an institutionally imperfect international
organization will function. A truly "international" body of law governing
atomic energy as opposed to a body of 19th Century Western European
law, could then develop. If co-operation is not desired in meeting the goals
set out for the international organization, a mechanically perfect interna-
tional institution cannot perform its tasks. Gadgetry in international in-
stitutions cannot solve basic differences in goals and means to such goals.
Assuming that the control of proliferation and the prevention of di-
version were the goals of the American originators of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, these goals will be without the reach of the Agency
so long as the safeguards provisions of the Agency continue to apply only to
beneficiary nations. Until meaningful steps are taken to decrease the
strategic reliance upon nuclear weapons by the two major powers, the
Agency will only serve to insure that "not the slightest leakage takes place
from the wall of a tank, while ignoring the fact that the tank has no
bottom. 517
57. Statement of Dr. H. J. Bhabba, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy
Agency, U.N. Doc. IAEA/CS/OR, 7, at 50-51.
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